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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann, Section 
78-2-2(3) (j) (Repl. Vol. 9, 1987); Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure; and Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented by this appeal are: 
(1) Whether the trial court correctly found that Manila Town 
has the legal right to condemn defendant's property for the purpose 
of constructing a sewer treatment facility. 
(2) Whether Manila Town is required to continue to negotiate 
for the purchase of defendant's property when the defendants 
agents and attorneys repeatedly refused to discuss the terms of 
acquisition insisting that Manila Town build the lagoons someplace 
other than on defendant's property. 
(3) Whether the defendant is entitled to a second evidentiary 
hearing on issues raised by defendant when the trial court, at 
defendant's request, has already held an evidentiary hearing, 
entered findings, and certified those findings as being final and 
the law of the case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Town of Manila is not satisfied with the defendant's 
statement of the case and, pursuant to Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, sets forth its own statement of the case. 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Trial 
Court's Disposition. 
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The Town of Manila applied for federal and state funding for 
the construction of a new sewage treatment facility. After funding 
was granted and after providing a public comment period, the 
facility plan and site was approved by the Environmental Protection 
Agency. After attempts to acquire the site by negotiation and 
purchase, the Town of Manila filed an action in the Eighth District 
Court to condemn the property for the purpose of constructing and 
operating the new facility. (R. at 1). 
At the request of the defendant, the trial court held an 
evidentiary hearing on June 29, 1989 to consider defendant's Motion 
to Dismiss Manila Town's complaint (R. at 57) and Manila Town's 
Motion for an Order of Immediate Occupancy. (R. at 9) . Both sides 
called witnesses and submitted exhibits. The trial court heard 
argument and received legal memoranda on the issues. (R. at 60, 78; 
T. at 6-12) . The trial court then entered its findings and an 
order denying defendant's Motion to Dismiss (R. at 139-41; Addendum 
1), and granting the Order of Immediate Occupancy. (R. at 145-50; 
Addendum 2 and 3). The trial court, at defendant's request, 
certified the findings and orders as final and appealable. (R. at 
288-89; Addendum 5). 
B. Statement of Facts. 
The Town of Manila's existing sewage treatment system is 
failing and rated by state health officials as inadequate. (T. at 
79-82). Both state and federal health officials placed the system 
on a high priority list for replacement. (T. at 145-46). 
The Town of Manila acquired a grant from the Environmental 
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Protection Agency and an interest free loan from the State of Utah 
Bureau of Water Pollution Control to replace its existing sewage 
treatment facility. Because of time limits placed on the use of 
the funds, delay in starting the project could lead to the 
forfeiture of the funding. (T. at 145-46). State and federal 
health officials, and the engineer hired by the Town of Manila, 
made extensive studies of the alternative sites and different ways 
for replacing the existing treatment facilities. The engineer 
concluded that the best method is a lagoon system and the best site 
is on defendants land. (T. at 78-105) . A plan was designed and 
approved by State and Federal authorities. (T. at 105). Public 
comment opportunities were provided and hearings were held to 
receive comment on the proposal. (T. at 142-43). 
Agents of the defendant were personally contacted by Manila 
Town's mayor, engineers designing the project, and legal counsel. 
The defendant's position on each contact was that he did net want 
the project built on his property and he would not discuss the 
purchase of the property. Manila Town's engineer, Allan R. Strong, 
made the initial contact with the defendant notifying him of the 
proposed project the site-selection process and how it involved 
his property. (T. at 34-35; Exhibit PI). Manila Town's mayor, 
Carol Scott, later contacted the defendant about the site selected 
by the engineer. The site was located on a grass pasture owned by 
the defendant. (T. at 213). Defendant refused to discuss 
purchasing the property, insisting that the facility should be at 
another location. (T. at 49-51). Manila Town's attorney tried 
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several times to contact the defendant. When unable to contact the 
defendant by telephone, a letter was written to the defendant 
notifying him of the site selected for the project and Manila 
Town's desire to purchase his property. (T. at 54-55; Exhibit P5). 
Defendant refused to discuss the purchase of this property but 
asked that alternative sites be further studied by engineers. 
Consent by the defendant was given to enter his property to study 
alternative sites. (T. at 37; Exhibit P2) . The engineers met with 
defendant and reviewed other sites. All alternative sites were 
unsatisfactory due to wetland restrictions, soil conditions, and 
location. (T. at 56-57; Exhibit P3) . Defendant then requested that 
further contacts be made with his attorney and stated that he would 
contest che matter at all costs. (T. at 57-58)- Defendant's 
attorney at that time, Reed Martineau, was contacted and provided 
a plat and the appraised value of defendant's property. (T. at 58; 
Exhibit ?5) . Defendant's position did not change. Defendant, 
refused to negotiate the purchase of his property and insisted that 
it be located at a different site. (T. at 58-60). 
The Town of Manila then brought an action in the Eighth 
District Court to condemn approximately 35 acres of defendant's 
grass pasture. (R. at 1) . This site was selected by engineers 
because it was the most suitable site for sewage lagoons, which 
system was determined to be the most cost-effective system for 
Manila Town. (T. at 99-104). Defendant's own expert, Robert Okey, 
agreed that the lagoon system was a suitable system. The site he 
determined the best was located in the middle of defendant's field 
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and defendant was equally as adamant that that site not be used. 
(T. at 217, 221) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court correctly found that the Town of Manila 
does have the legal right to condemn the defendant's property, in 
fee simple and outside its corporate boundaries, to construct and 
operate a sewage treatment facility thereon. The legislature has 
granted the right to condemn to many governmental entities, 
including towns. Utah's condemnation statute, as well as the 
statute setting forth the general powers of towns, authorizes towns 
to condemn property for the construction and installation of such 
improvement. 
II. The Town of Manila is net required to continue to 
negotiate for the purchase of defendant's property when defendant's 
agents and attorneys repeatedly told Manila Town that defendant 
would not discuss ::he sale of the property because it did not want 
the lagoons built on its property. The Town of Manila has complied 
with the requirements of the Utah Code to condemn defendant's 
property. The trial court after an evidentiary hearing found that 
the construction and operation of a sewage treatment facility by 
Manila Town is a public use authorized by law; the taking of 
defendant's property is necessary for such use; and the Town of 
Manila has attempted to commence the project within a reasonable 
time. 
III. Defendant is not entitled to a second evidentiary 
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hearing on issues raised by defendant when the trial court has 
already held an evidentiary hearing, entered findings, and 
certified those findings as being final and the law of the case. 
The defendant's challenge of Manila Town's legal power to condemn 
was fully briefed, argued and then decided by the trial court. The 
issues of fact regarding compliance with the Relocation Act and the 
appropriateness of the site selection were then fully litigated, 
argued, and decided by the court. It would be a waste of time to 
rebrief, argue and relitigate those issues. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE TOWN OF 
MANILA HAS THE LEGAL RIGHT TO CONDEMN DEFENDANT'S PROPERTY FOR THE 
PURPOSE OF CONSTRUCTING AND OPERATING A SEWER TREATMENT FACILITY. 
A. The Town of Manila has the legal right to condemn. 
The authority to condemn private property resides exclusively 
in the legislature. That authority can also be delegated to other 
government entities such as municipalities, including towns. Bd. 
of County Comm'r v. Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass'n, 655 P.2d 831, 
83 3 (Colo. 198 3) ; Hous. Auth. of Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. 
Langley, 555 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Okla. 1976); Concerned Citizens, 
United, Inc. v. Kansas Power and Light Co.. 523 P.2d 755, 762 (Kan. 
1974) 2 Nichols on Eminent Domain Sections 3.2, 3.21 (3d ed. 
1980). The Utah legislature has delegated, by statute, the right 
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to condemn real property to Utah towns. 
Utah's eminent domain statute, Utah Code Ann. Section 78-34-
1(3), (9), as well as the statutory general powers of towns, in 
Chapter 8 of Title 10 of the Utah Code, confers upon towns the 
right to condemn property to construct sewer lagoons. Utah Code 
Ann. Section 10-8-94 expressly states that: 
Towns have the same powers and authority granted to 
cities under this chapter, in addition to other powers 
conferred by law.... 
Utah Code Ann. Section 10-8-14 grants to towns the right to 
construct, maintain and operate sewer systems. Utah Code Ann. 
Section 10-8-38 also gives towns power to construct, maintain and 
operate sewer systems. Utch Code Ann. Section 10-16-4(1) (c) gives 
any municipality the power to construct sewer systems and the right 
to acquire any property necessary to construct such a system. A 
"municipality" is defined as ,fa city or town of this state." Utah 
Code Ann. Section 10-16-3(9). 
3. The Tc wn of Manila has the legal right to acquire 
defendant's property in fee simple. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-34-2 provides that a town may 
condemn in fee simple when such property is taken for "public 
buildings or grounds" and "reservoirs." Precise statutory language 
on the public use for which condemnation in fee simple is to be 
applied is not required. All that is required is that the 
legislative intent to allow condemnation in fee simple be clear and 
that such intention is consistent with the language used in the 
statute. Bd. of Educ. of Unified School Dist. v. Vic Rognier 
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Builders, Inc., 648 P.2d 1143, 1146 (Kan. 1982); State v. Taylor, 
638 P.2d 630, 637 (Wash. App. 1982). The treatment system to be 
installed by the Town of Manila is public grounds whereon 
reservoirs for the holding of sewage and wastewater are to be 
constructed. (T. at 112-13). The trial court specifically found 
that the proposed sewage lagoons fit well within the language of 
Section 78-34-2. (R. at 140). 
C. The Town of Manila has the legal right to acquire 
defendants property outside its boundaries. 
The legislature specifically gave towns the right to condemn 
property for construction of sewer systems. Utah Code Ann. Section 
73-34-1(3), (9) authorizes the right of eminent domain to 
incorporated towns for the following public uses: 
[PJublic buildings and grounds...; reservoirs...; 
and all ether public uses...; 
[SJewerace of any city or town.... 
This provision makes no requirement that the property for sewage 
treatment facilities be within Manila Town's corporate boundaries. 
The Utah legislature has given the power to "any 
municipality/1 which includes towns (Utah Code Ann. Section 10-16-
3(9)), to construct sewer systems and acquire "any property 
necessary or advisable" for its construction. Utah Code Ann. 
Section 10-16-4 (1) (c) (Emphasis added). Again, no limitation is 
made. 
The Municipal Bond Act which provides means for funding a 
sewer system provides at Utah Code Ann. Section 11-14-1(2): 
Any such improvement facility or property need not 
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lie within the limits of the municipality. 
A sewage treatment system need not and in many cases should not be 
located within the boundaries of a small municipality like the Town 
of Manila. Rather, it should be placed in a less populated and 
geographically suitable area. The Town of Manila contracted with 
engineers to determine the type of treatment facility needed and to 
locate the most suitable site for such facility, both 
geographically and economically. These engineers determined that 
the most appropriate site is defendant's property. (T. 78-105; 
Exhibit P3) . The trial court found that to prevent Manila Town 
from condemning defendant's property would conflict with its 
obligation to provide for -_>.e health and safety of its citizens and 
its authority to provide such services for its citizens. (R. at 
14 0; Addendum 1). 
POINT II. THE TO' ' OF MANILA IS NOT REQUIRED TO CONTINUE TO 
NEGOTIATE ?0R THE PURCHASE OF DEFENDANT'S PROPERTY WHEN DEFENDANT 
REPEATEDLY INSISTS THAT IT DOES NOT WANT THE FACILITY ON ITS 
PROPERTY, REFUSES TO DISCUSS THE PURCHASE OF THE PROPERTY AND 
INSISTS THE FACILITY BE LOCATED ELSEWHERE. 
A. The Town of Manil i met the conditions precedent for an 
order of immediate occupancy. 
After reviewing evidence and hearing argument by the parties 
in an evidentiary hearing (R. at 44, 78; T. 70-230), the trial 
court found that the Town of Manila fully complied with the 
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conditions precedent to condemnation and taking of property set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. Section 78-34-4. They are: 
(1) that the use to which it is to be applied is a use 
authorized by law; 
(2) that the taking is necessary to such use; 
(3) that construction and use of all property sought to be 
condemned will commence within a reasonable time as determined by 
the court, after the initiation of proceedings under this 
chapter.... 
The trial court found the construction of a sewage facility to 
be a use authorized by law, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sections 10-
8-14, 10-8-38 and 10-16-4. (R. at 145-46; T. at 23-25; Addendum 
2) . The trial court found evidence to show that the site selected 
was the most appropriate site. (R. at 146; Addendum 2). Finally, 
the trial court found evidence to show that Manila Town was ready 
to proceed with construction as soon as it received the Order of 
Immediate Occupancy. (R. at 146-47, 149-50; Addendum 2-3). The 
trial court's finding regarding che compliance with Utah Code Ann. 
Section 78-34-4 was found to be fully supported by the facts. 
B. Manila Town's selection of defendant's property for the 
treatment facility should not be disturbed by the court because bad 
faith or abuse of discretion on the part of Manila Town is not an 
issue in the case. 
Absent bad faith, abuse of discretion or fraud, Manila Town's 
selection of the defendant's property to locate the sewer treatment 
facility cannot be disturbed by the court. See, Bountiful v. 
Swift, 535 P.2d 123.6 (1975). At the evidentiary hearing, and with 
the full support of the defendant, bad faith, abuse of discretion 
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or fraud on the part of Manila Town were determined not to be 
issues in the case. (T. at 221-22) . Furthermore, the trial court 
found that no showing of fraud, bad faith or abuse of discretion 
had been made by the defendant. (R. at 146; Addendum 2) . Defendant 
tried to raise the issue subsequently as its Fifth Affirmative 
Defense in its Amended Answer (R. at 155), but was ordered stricken 
by the court because the defendant objected to such issue being 
raised at the hearing, the court determined it not to be an issue 
in the case and that it intended its decision to be dispositive. 
(R. at 239-40; Addendum 4). 
C. To the extent reasonably possible, the Town of Manila 
complied with the requirements of the Utah Relocation Assistance 
Act. 
The general intent and purpose of the Utah Relocation 
Assistance Act is to provide displacement assistance for persons 
and businesses who are uprooted as a result of a condemnation 
action. See, Utah Code Ann. Sections 57-12-2, 57-12-3(3),(6); 
Annotation, "Validity, Construction, and Application of State 
Relocation Laws," 49 ALR 4th 491, 504 (1986). The Act's underlying 
policy concerns of displaced persons, homes and businesses are not 
entirely applicable to the facts of this case. 
The Act requires, among other things, that "reasonable" 
efforts be made to negotiate the acquisition of the property; that 
the property be appraised and the owner be given an opportunity to 
accompany the appraiser during his inspection; and that an amount 
be established for the property before the initiation of 
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negotiations• Utah Code Ann, Section 57-12-13. Contrary to the 
defendant's assertions, the Town of Manila and its agents have gone 
to great lengths to negotiate the acquisition of the property from 
the defendant. 
In the fall of 1988, once the engineers had determined the 
appropriate location for the treatment facilities, the Mayor of 
Manila Town contacted the defendant's officer to discuss purchasing 
the property. He refused to negotiate a purchase. (T. at 49-51). 
The Town of Manila then hired legal counsel to discuss the matter 
with the defendant. Legal counsel tried several times to contact 
the defendant's officer about purchasing the property. When unable 
to contact the defendant's officer by telephone, legal counsel 
wrote to defendant's officer. (T. at 54-55; Exhibit P5) . He 
responded to the letter by telephone and indicated that he did not 
think it was an appropriate place to build the lagoons. (T. at 56-
57) . At the request of the defendant's officer, the engineers went 
back to Manila and looked at some other alternative sites that he 
suggested. After reviewing those sites the engineers still 
recommended the original site. The engineers, on behalf of Manila 
Town, met with defendant's officer and discussed with him the 
several sites they had investigated and the reasons for choosing 
the subject property. (T. at 56-57; Exhibit P3) . Defendant's 
officer referred the Town's attorney to defendant's attorney and 
over a period of months the attorneys discussed the location and 
appraised value of the proposed site and other matters. (T. at 58-
60; Exhibit P6). 
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The Town of Manila met all of the purposes and terms of the 
Relocation Assistance Act and did all things required by the Act 
which defendant would allow it to do. It would have been futile 
for Manila Town to take any other steps regarding appraisals or 
negotiation of value due to defendant's refusal to discuss those 
issues. 
POINT III. DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A SECOND EVIDENTIARY 
HEARING ON ISSUES OF LAW RAISED 3Y DEFENDANT WHEN THE TRIAL COURT 
ALREADY ENTERED FINDINGS AND ORDERS DISPOSITIVE ON THOSE ISSUES. 
Defendant requested tre trial court to hold an evidentiary 
hearing on certain iss' -s raised by the defendant in its Motion to 
Dismiss Manila Town's complaint. Certain legal issues were argued 
by the parties and were submitted to the court for a ruling as a 
matter of law. (R. at 57, 60, 78; T. at 6-23). Those issues were: 
a) whether the Town of Manila has the legal right to condemn, b) 
whether it has the power to condemn outside its boundaries, c) 
whether it can condemn property in fee simple, and d) whether the 
defendant can require Manila Town to construct its lagoons at 
another site absent any claim that Manila abused its discretion or 
acted in bad faith. Defendant raised these defenses in its Third, 
Fifth and Sixth Affirmative Defenses which were stricken by the 
court. (R. at 155-56, 239-40; Addendum 4). The trial court ruled 
on each of those issues and intended the findings and orders to be 
dispositive and final. (R. at 139-40, 239-40, 288-89; Addendum 1, 
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4-5) . These issues are all questions of law. This Court can 
review the appropriateness of the trial court's decision. There is 
no need for the trial court to rule a second time on the legal 
issues. 
The factual issues raised by defendant were whether the 
Relocation Act was complied with, whether the requirements for an 
Order of Immediate Occupancy were met (i.e., authorized public use, 
taking was necessary, and when construction would begin) and 
whether some other site was more appropriate. All facts necessary 
to determine these factual issues were submitted to the court and 
the court made its ruling on each. (R. at 139-40, 145-50; Addendum 
1-3). 
The defendant submitted an affidavit from J.R. Broadbent (R. 
at 125) regarding defendant's claim of lack of compliance with the 
Relocation Acz, while Manila Town called its mayor, engineer and 
attorney at witnesses. Defendant's counsel admitted that the 
affidavit represented all of the facts on that issue and submitted 
it to the court as its evidence. (T. at 23, 26, 65). The trial 
court then made its findings and order. (R. at 14 0-41; Addendum 
1). 
On the issues of the public necessity and site selection, 
Manila Town called its engineer and state health officials. 
Defendant called its expert, Mr. Okey. The matter was then 
submitted to the trial court which entered its findings and order. 
(R. at 145-50; Addendum 2-3). The defendant's Fourth Affirmative 
Defense and First Cause of Action in its Amended Answer (R. at 155, 
14 
158) raised these same issues and were properly stricken by the 
trial court. (R. at 239-40; Addendum 4). It would be a waste of 
time for the trial court to rehear the same evidence and make the 
same findings. 
Defendant claims that Utah State Road Comm'n v. Friberg, 687 
P. 2d 821 (Utah 1984) entitles him to a second hearing. Friberg is 
factually different from this case. In Friberg, the Court pointed 
out that there had not been an evidentiary hearing by stating that: 
In the instant case, the order of immediate 
occupancy, on its face, did not decide the jurisdictional 
conditions precedent to a final judgment and decree. The 
order states: "It is further ordered and adjudged that 
pending further hearing and trial on the issues zhat may 
be presented in this action, and subject to the 
conditions herein set forth" Friberg may not interfere 
with the State's possession of the premises. The trial 
court :nade no findings as to the State's authority to 
condemn. (Emphasis added). 
In the present case, and pursuant to the request of the 
defmeant, rhe trial court held a complete evidentiary hearing in 
which both parties presented evidence, both documentary a .d 
testimonial, and presented arguments supported by legal memoranda. 
(R. at 44, 60, 78, 104; T. at 25-26, 65-68). The trial court 
entered specific findings of fact and orders. (R. at 139-40; 
Addendum 1) . The evidentiary hearing included the issues in Manila 
Town's Motion for an Order of Immediate Occupancy and the issues 
raised in defendant's Motion to Dismiss. After defendant had its 
day in court and lost on those issues, it tried to raise them a 
second time as affirmative defenses and a counterclaim. The trial 
court entered its findings on this issue and as such is dispositive 
and the law of the case. (R. at 139-40, 239-240, 288-89; Addendum 
15 
1, 4-5) . The defendant has had its day in court. To rehear those 
issues would be a waste of judicial time and the parties1 time to 
relitigate such issues of law. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, it is requested that the 
Court affirm the trial court's findings and orders. 
/ Respectfully submitted this /1 day of May, 1990. 
McKEACHNIE, ALLRED & BUNNELL 
Attorneys fo/) Plaintiff/Respondent 
By: 
ClarkeB: Allred 
By: AuA, jy?s \(.e*rJL .t 
Gayle F. MeKeachnie 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I sep^cTa true copy of the foregoing 
Brief of Respondent on the ij day of May, 1990, by placing the 
same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the 
following: 
VAN WAGONER & STEVENS 
Lewis T. Stevens 
Craig W. Anderson 
Kristin G. Brewer 
215 South State Street 
Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW 
Edward W. Clyde 
77 West 200 South 
Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
ADDENDUM 
Findings and Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, 
dated July 12, 1989. 
Findings in Support of Granting Order of 
Immediate Occupancy, date July 12, 1989. 
Order, dated July 12, 1989. 
Order, date September 26, 1989. 
Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Certify 
Ruling Denying Motion to Dismiss as a Final 
Appealable Order, dated December 5, 1989. 
Relevant Statutes. 
CLARK B. ALLRED - «055 
GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE - 220* 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
363 East Main Street 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: (801) 789-4908 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAGGETT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TOWN OF MANILA, 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
BROADBENT LAND COMPANY, 
Defendant. ] 
) FINDINGS AND ORDER 
) DENYING MOTION TO | DISMISS 
Civil NO. 306B 
This matter having come before the Court pursuant to 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint dated June 
26, 1989. The Court heard oral argument on the legal issues set 
forth in the Motion and also received evidence regarding 
compliance with the Utah Relocation Assistance Act, Utah Code 
Ann. §57-12-1. The Court being fully advised makes the following 
Findings. 
FINDINGS 
1. Defendant has not given to the Court sufficient 
reasons, either legal or factual, why the Plaintiff does not have 
power to condemn. The constitutional and statutory provisions 
cited by the Defendant do not prevent the town from having 
condemnation powers. The Eminent Domain statute, §78-34-1, et. 
seq., specifically provides that towns do have eminent domain 
powers for sewer systems. To prevent the town from condemning 
would be in conflict to the obligations and duties placed on 
towns to provide for the health and safety of its citizens and 
town's authority to provide wastewater systems for its citizens. 
2. The language in §78-34-2 regarding the power to condemn 
fee simple title for public grounds and reservoirs is 
sufficiently broad to allow the Town of Manila to condemn, in fee 
simple, the property upon which it seeks to build its wastewater 
treatment lagoons. 
3. J.R. Broadbent, the managing partner of the Defendant, 
has known of the proposal of the town to construct a new sewer 
lagoon system since its inception. He was contacted at the 
beginning by engineers seeking authority to go on his property to 
dig test pits, percolation pits and otherwise determine the 
feasibility of various sites. When the engineers had selected 
the site numerous attempts were made by the town, through its 
agents, to contact the Defendant and to negotiate the purchase of 
the property. Defendant has been or has had every reasonable 
opportunity to be fully acquainted with the process since the 
beginning and to be fully aware of the project and the steps that 
have been taken. 
4. J.R. Broadbent has been invited to go on the property 
with agents of the Plaintiff. An appraisal was done. J.R. 
Broadbent was aware of the appraisal, the amount of the appraisal 
and discussed the appraisal, with agents of Manila Town indicating 
that he did not consider it to be high enough. 
2 
5. J.R. Broadbent's insistence in all contacts, either by 
Mr. Broadbent or his attorneys, with agents of Plaintiff was that 
the lagoons be built on a different site. He refused to discuss 
the question of price. 
6. All the purposes of the Relocation Assistance Act have 
been met by the Plaintiff. It would have been futile by 
Plaintiff to take any other steps regarding appraisals or 
negotiation of value due to Defendant's refusal to discuss those 
issues with the Plaintiffs or even to meet with and discuss with 
the Plaintiff the acquisition of the property. 
7. Plaintiff has substantially complied with the terms of 
the Relocation Assistance Act and have done all things required 
by the Act which Defendant would allow it to do. 
The Court having made the above Findings, hereby; 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint is denied. 
DATED this/^^day of July, 1989. 
Dennis L. Draney 
District Judge 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF UINTAH ) 
JuNae Cook, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the office of NIELSEN & SENIOR, 
Clark B. Allred, attorneys for Plaintiff, herein, that she served 
the attached FINDINGS AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS upon 
counsel by sending a true and correct copy thereon in an envelope 
addressed to: 
Mr. Craig W. Anderson 
VAN WAGONER & STEVENS 
215 South State Street 
Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and deposited the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid 
thereon, in the United States mail at Vernal, Utah on the // day 
of J u l y , 1939. (kJM. 
JX^ae Cook 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of July, 
1989. 
My commission expires: Notaryf Pu. 
0
 " Residing at Vernal, Utah 
CLARK B. ALLRED - 0055 
GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE - 22 00 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
363 East Main Street 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: (801) 789-4908 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAGGETT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TOWN OF MANILA, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. , 
BROADBENT LAND COMPANY, ' 
Defendant. ) 
) FINDINGS IN SUPPORT OF 
) GRANTING ORDER OF 
) IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY 
i Civil No. 306B 
The above captioned matter having come before the Court on 
June 29, 1989 pursuant to Plaintiff's Motion and the Court's 
Order to Show Cause regarding the issuance of an Order of 
Immediate Occupancy. Plaintiff was represented by its attorneys, 
Clark B. Allred and Gu;le F. McKeachnie. Defendant was 
represented by its attorney, Craig W. Anderson, Witnesses were 
called and testimony was received. The Court also received legal 
Memoranda and oral argument from counsel regarding the issues. 
The Court hereby makes the following Findings 
FINDINGS 
1. Before the Court can grant the request for an Order of 
Immediate Occupancy, the Plaintiff must prove that the conditions 
of Utah Code Ann. §78-34-4 and §38-34-9 have been met. 
2. §38-4-4(1) has been complied with in that Utah law, 
including Utah Code Ann. §10-8-14, §10-8-38 and §10-16-4 
authorize the construction of wastewater treatment systems by 
towns. 
3. Utah Code Ann. §78-34-4(2) has been complied with and 
the evidence shows that it was necessary for the town to 
construct a new wastewater treatment facility. The present 
system of the Town of Manila is failing and needs to be replaced. 
The specific details of the problems with the present system are 
set forth in Exhibit 10, at page 2. 
4. The property that Plaintiff seeks to condemn is 
necessary for the installation of the wastewater treatment 
facility. It is not necessary that the Plaintiff nor the Court 
find that the town has selected, the best or only alternative 
site. The facts show that the site selected by the town, is a 
result of careful, significant studies by its engineers, which 
studies have been reviewed and approved by both the state and 
federal government. There is no showing that the town's 
selection of the site nor the system it proposes to be used has 
been a result of fraud, bad faith or abuse of discretion, but 
rather has been based on substantial studies and is reasonable. 
5. Utah Code Ann. §78-34-4(3) has been complied with in 
that the facility's plans have been completed, funding has been 
granted and Plaintiff plans to immediately enter upon the 
property and start design work. Upon gaining access to the 
property it anticipates the design work will completed within two 
to four months and that construction work will immediately begin 
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and be completed within six months. 
6. Utah Code Ann- §78-34-4(4) is inapplicable to this 
factual situation. 
7. The requirements of Utah Code Ann. §78-34-9 have been 
met. The facts showed that Plaintiff needs immediate occupancy 
of the property to proceed with design engineering and 
construcrion of the project. Plaintiff has available funding for 
the project through a grant and an interest free loan. One 
deadline has passed on those funds and the other deadline is 
rapidly approaching. Those funds are still available as a result 
of the good graces of the government entities granting those 
funds, but continued delay will jeopardized those funds. 
Furthermore, the present system is a threat to public health, is 
violating the discharge permit and needs to be replaced. 
8. The testimony of Defendant's expert, Mr. Oakey, was 
helpful to the Court, including information that the proposed 
project is reasonable. 
9. The Plaintiff's appraisal values the property at 
$14,000.00. 75% of that amount is $10,500.00. 
DATED this/3 **day of July, 1989. 
<£ 
Dennis L. D r a n e y 7 7 
District Judge 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF UINTAH ) 
JuNae Cook, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the office of NIELSEN & SENIOR, 
Clark B. Allred, attorneys for Plaintiff, herein, that she served 
the attached FINDINGS IN SUPPORT OF GRANTING ORDER OF IMMEDIATE 
OCCUPANCY upon counsel by sending a true and correct copy thereon 
in an envelope addressed to: 
Mr. Craig W. Anderson 
VAN WAGONER & STEVENS 
215 South State Street 
Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and deposited the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid 
thereon, in the United States mail at Vernal, Utah on the// day 
of July, 1989. 
J^ ftfae Cook 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of July, 
1989. 
NbtaTrV^Wblic / ^ My ^commission expires: o ry 
Residing/ at Vernal, Utah 
CLARK B. ALLRED - 0055 
GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE - 2200 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
363 East Main Street 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: (801) 789-4908 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF bAGGETT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TOWN OF MANILA, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BROADBENT LAND COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 306B 
The above captioned matter having come before the Court 
pursuant to Plaintiff s Motion and the Count's Order to Show 
Cause regarding the granting to Plaintiff of an Order of 
Immediate Occupancy. The Court having received testimony and 
having entered its Findings, hereby enters the following Order. 
1. Plaintiff's Motion for an Order of Immediate Occupancy 
is hereby granted. 
2. Plaintiff is hereby authorized to immediately occupy 
the premises described herein and to commence all work and 
activity necessary on said property to construct its sewage 
treatment facilities, including design engineering and the 
construction of said facilities. 
3. The property Plaintiff is entitled to occupy, as 
provided in paragraph 2, is located in Daggett County, Utah and 
is described as follows: 
A parcel of property being a part of Lot 3 and Lot 4 
and part of the North half of the Southwest quarter of 
Section 15, Township 3 North, Range 20 East, of the 
Salt Lake Meridian, Utah; said parcel being bounded on 
the North by the South right-of-way line of an existing 
county road and being bounded on the East by a portion 
of the West line of the Flaming Gorge National 
Recreational Area; 
Being more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at a point on the South right-of-way line of 
an existing county road, said point being North 89° 4 4 
minutes East 10,59 chains more or less along said 
right-of-way from the West line of said Section 15; and 
running thence North 89° 44 minutes East 1650 feet more 
or less along said right-of-way to the West boundary of 
the Flaming Gorge National Recreation Area; thence 
South 0° 42 minutes West to a point South 0° 16 minutes 
East 925 feet and North 89° 58 minutes East 1650 feet 
from said point of beginning; thence South 89° 58 
minutes West 1650 feet; thence North 0° 16 ninutes West 
925 feet more or less to the point of beginning. 
Contains 35.0379 acres. 
4. Prior to occupying the premises, Plaintiff must deposit 
with the Court $10,500.00, The Court notes that the Plaintiff 
has deposited with the Court a check for $14,000.00. 
DATED this/*? day of July, 1989. 
Dennis L. Draney 
District Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF UINTAH ) 
JuNae Cook, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the office of NIELSEN & SENIOR, 
ClarJc B. Allred, attorneys for Plaintiff, herein, that she served 
the attached ORDER upon counsel by sending a true and correct 
copy thereon in an envelope addressed to: 
Mr. Craig W. Anderson 
VAN WAGONER & STEVENS 
215 South State S4 aet 
Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and deposited the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid 
therecn, in the United States mail at Vernal, Utah on the// day 
of Julv, 1989. I 
JpNae Cock 
1989, 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this //^Oday of July, 
My ^commission expires Notary /Public ' " ^ 
Residing at Vernal, Utah 
CLARK B. ALLRED - 0055 
GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE - 2200 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
363 East Main Street 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: (801) 789-4908 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAGGETT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TOWN OF MANILA, .] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ; 
BROADBENT LAND COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
| ORDER 
Civil No. CV306B 
The above captioned matter came before the Court pursuant to 
Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss and to Strike and Defendant's 
Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum. The Court having 
reviewed the Motions, the Memoranda and being fully advised, 
hereby; 
ORDERS as follows: 
1. Defendant's Motion to Strike is denied. Defendant has 
not shown any prejudice was caused by the delay in filing the 
response, 
2. Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss and to Strike is granted. 
The Court held an Evidentiary Hearing, received legal Memoranda 
f rom ' the parties and has ruled upon the issues presented in the 
First Cause of Action in Defendant's Counterclaim and the Third, 
Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Affirmative Defenses in the Amended 
Answer. The Court intended that Order to be dispositive of those 
issues. 
3. It is hereby Ordered that the First Cause of Action in 
Defendant's Counterclaim is dismissed and the Third Affirmative 
Defense, Fourth Affirmative Defense, Fifth Affirmative Defense 
and Sixth Affirmative Defense in Defendant's Amended Answer are 
hereby stricken. 
DATED this n/\ day of September, 1989. 
-& 
Denni^ L. Draney 
Di s t r i c t Judge 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF UINTAH ) 
JuNae Cook, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the office of NIELSEN & SENIOR, 
Clark B. Allred, attorneys for Plaintiff, herein, that she served 
the attached ORDER upon counsel by sending a true and correct 
copy thereon in an envelope addressed to: 
Mr. Craig W. Anderson 
VAN WAGONER & STEVENS 
215 South State Street 
Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and deposited the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid 
thereon, in the United States mail at Vernal, Utah on the /^ day 
of September, 1989. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of September, 
1989. S 
My commission expires: Notary Public / 
Re/siding at Vernal, Utah 
V - ar- <?n 
CMt., 
'j&EiL 
County CHrtt 
£ ~ ^ " ^ 7 
* t pas F" f i ^ 
VAN WAGONER & STEVENS 
LEWIS T. STEVENS (A3104) 
CRAIG W. ANDERSON (A0078) 
215 South State Street 
Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1036 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAGGETT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO CERTIFY RULING 
DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS 
AS A FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER 
TOWN 
V. 
OF MANILA ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
BROADBENT LAND COMPANY ) 
Defendant. ) 
Civil No, CV3 063 
Judge Dennis L, Draney 
h Based upon Defendant, Broadbent Land Company's Motion for 
•:| an Order Certifying the Court's Ruling dated September 8, 1989, 
• < 
|j and Order striking defendant's affirmative defenses and 
ij dismissing the first cause of action of its counterclaim; the 
i j 
! Findings and Order denying defendant's Motion to Dismiss; the 
; i 
!; Findings and Order granting plaintiff's Motion for an Order of 
j! 
11 Immediate Occupancy; and after reviewing the Memoranda and 
Points and Authorities submitted by counsel for the parties and 
being fully advised therein; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that pursuant 
to Rule 54 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, there is no 
just reason for delaying its appeal and, therefore, defendant, 
Broadbent Land Company's Motion to Certify be and hereby is 
granted and that the following Rulings and Judgments are final 
appealable Judgments and Orders as provided for in Rule 3(a) of 
the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court: 
1. The Court!s Ruling dated September 8, 1989, and 
subsequent Order striking defendant's affirmative 
defenses 3 through 7 and dismissing the first cause 
of action of its counterclaim, 
2. The Findings and Order denying defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss dated July 12, 1989. 
3. The Findings and Order entered by the Court granting 
plaintiff1 s Motion for an Order of Immediate 
Occupancy dated July 12, 1989. 
DATED this-5^Tday of December, 1989. 
BY THE COURT 
Dennis L. Draney 
District Court JudgeL 
501.BDB 
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RELEVANT STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. Section 10-8-14: 
They may construct, maintain and operate waterworks, sewer 
collection, sewer treatment systems, gas works, electric light 
works, telephone lines or public transportation systems.,.. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 10-8-38(1): 
(1)Boards of commissioners, city councils and boards of trustees of 
cities and towns may construct, reconstruct, maintain and operate, 
sewer systems, sewage treatment plants, culverts, drains, sewers, 
catch basins, manholes, cesspools, and all systems, equipment and 
facilities necessary to the proper drainage, sewerage and sanitary 
sewage disposal requirements of the city or town and regulate the 
construction and use thereof 
Utah Code Ann. Section 10---94(1): 
Towns have the same powers and authority granted to cities under 
this chapter, in addit on to ether powers conferred by law, but 
subject to the followir.g: 
(1) The town council may enact finances providing for the public 
safety, health, morals, and WE fare of the town which are not 
prohibited, preempted by, or inconsistent with, the policy of state 
or federal law or the constitution of Utah or the United States, or 
attempt to regulate an area which by the nature of the subject 
requires uniform state regulation. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 10-16-3(9)(Repl. Vol. 2A, 1986): 
"Municipality" means city or town of this state. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 10-16-4(1)(c)(Repl. Vol. 2A, 1986): 
(1) The governing body of any municipality shall have power to 
make or cause to be made any one or more or combination of the 
following improvements: 
(c) to construct, reconstruct, extend, maintain or repair bridges, 
sidewalks, crosswalks, driveways, culverts, sewers, storm sewers, 
drains, flood barriers and channels;.... 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 11-14-1(2)(Repl. Vol. 2A, 1986): 
Any such improvement, facility or property need not lie within the 
limits of the municipality. 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 57-12-2 (Utah Relocation Assistance Act): 
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this act and of the State 
of Utah, and the Legislature recognizes: 
(1) That it is often necessary for the various agencies of 
state and local government to acquire land by condemnation; 
(2) That persons, businesses, and farms are often uprooted 
and displaced by such action while being recompensed only for the 
value of the land taken; 
(3) That such displacement often works economic hardship on 
those least able to suffer the added and uncompensated costs of 
being relocated; 
(4) That such added expenses should reasonably be included as 
a part of the project cost and paid to those displaced: 
(5) That the Congress of the United States has established 
matching grants for relocation assistance, and has also established 
uniform policies for land acquisition under the Uniform Relocation 
Assistance and Land Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, to assist the 
states in meeting these expenses and assuring that land is fairly 
acquired; 
(6) That it is in the public interest for the state of Utah 
to provide for such payments and to establish such land acquisition 
policies. 
Therefore, the purpose of this act is to establish a uniform 
policy for the fair and equitable treatment of persons displaced by 
the acquisition of real property by state and local land 
acquisition programs, by building code enforcement activities, or 
by a program of voluntary rehabilitation of buildings or other 
improvements conducted pursuant to governmental supervision. 
All of the provisions of the act shall be liberally construed 
to put into effect the foregoing policies and purposes. 
Utah Code Ann., Sec. 57-12-13: 
Any agency acquiring real property as to which it has the power to 
acquire under the eminent domain or condemnation laws of this state 
shall comply with the following policies: 
(1) Every reasonable effort shall be made to acquire 
expeditiously real property by negotiation. 
(2) Real property shall be appraised before the initiation of 
negotiations, and the owner or his designated representative shall 
be given an opportunity to accompany the appraiser during his 
inspection of the property. 
(3) Before the initiation of negotiations for real property, 
an amount shall be established which is reasonably believed to be 
just compensation therefor, and such amount shall be offered for 
the property. In no event shall such amount be less than the 
lowest approved appraisal of the fair market value of the property. 
Any decrease or increase of the fair market value of real property 
prior to the date of valuation caused by the public improvement for 
which such property is acquired or by the likelihood that the 
property would be acquired for such improvement, other than that 
due to physical deterioration within the reasonable control of the 
owner, will be disregarded in determining the compensation for the 
property. The owner of the real property to be acquired shall be 
provided with a written statement of, and summary of the basis for, 
the amount established as just compensation. Where appropriate the 
just compensation for real property acquired and for damages to 
remaining real property shall be separately stated. 
(4) No owner shall be required to surrender possession of 
real property acquired through federal or federally assisted 
programs before the agreed purchase price is paid or there is 
deposited with a court having jurisdiction of condemnation of such 
property, in accordance with applicable law, for the benefit of the 
owner an amount not less than the lowest approved appraisal of the 
fair market value of such property or the amount of the award of 
compensation in the condemnation proceeding of such property. 
(5) The construction or development of a public improvement 
shall be so scheduled that, to the greatest extent practicable, no 
person lawfully occupying real property shall be required to move 
from a dwelling assuming a replacement dwelling will be available) 
or to move his business or farm operation without at least ninety 
days1 written notice from the date by which such move is required. 
(6) If an owner of tenant is permitted to occupy the real 
property acquired on a rental basis for a short term or for a 
period subject to termination on short notice, the amount of rent 
required snail not exceed the fair rental value of the property to 
a short-term occupier. 
(7) In no event shall the time of condemnation be advanced, 
on negotiations or condemnation and the deposit of funds in court 
for the use of the owner be deferred, or any other coercive action 
be taken to compel an agreement on the price to be paid for the 
property. 
(8) If an interest in real property is to be acquired by 
exercise of the power of eminent domain, formal condemnation 
proceeding shall be instituted. The acquiring agency shall not 
intentionally make it necessary for an owner to institute legal 
proceedings to prove the face of the taking of his real property. 
(9) If the acquisition of only part of the property would 
leave its owner with an uneconomic remnant, an offer to acquire the 
entire property shall be made. 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-34-1(3),(9): 
Subject to the provisions of this chapter, the right of eminent 
domain may be exercised in behalf of the following public uses: 
(3) public buildings and grounds for the use of any county, city 
or incorporated town, or board of education; reservoirs, canals, 
aqueducts, flumes, ditches, or pipes for conducting water for the 
use of the inhabitants of any county or city or incorporated town, 
or for the draining of any county, or incorporated town; the 
raising of the banks of streams, removing obstructions therefrom, 
and widening, deepening or straightening their channels; roads, 
streets and alleys; and all other public uses for the benefit of 
any county, city or incorporated town, or the inhabitants thereof. 
(9) sewerage of any city or town, or of any settlement of not less 
than ten families, or of any public building belonging to the 
state, or of any college or university. 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-34-2(a)(b)(c)(Repl. Vol. 9, 1987): 
The following estates and rights in lands are subject to being 
taken for public use: 
(1) a fee simple, when taken for: 
(a) public buildings or grounds; 
(b) for permanent buildings; 
(c) for reservoirs and dams and permanent flooding occasioned 
by them;.... 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-34-4: 
Before property can be taken it must appear: 
(1) that the use to which it is to be applied is a use authorized 
by law; 
(2) that the taking is necessary to such use; 
(3) that construction and use of all property sought to be 
condemned will commence within a reasonable time as determined by 
the court, after the initiation of proceedings under this chapter; 
and 
(4) if already appropriated to some public use, that the public 
use to which it is to be applied is a more necessary public use. 
